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ABSTRACT
We investigate the resiliency of IEEE802.11 rate adaptation algo-
rithms (RAA) against smart jamming attacks. We consider sev-
eral classes of state-of-the-art RAAs that include the SampleRate,
ONOE, AMRR, and the RAA used in Atheros Microsoft Windows
XP driver. We model the behavior of these algorithms, and show
the existence of very efﬁcient attacks thatexploit RAA-speciﬁcvul-
nerabilities as well as the inherent weaknesses that exist in the de-
sign of IEEE802.11 MAC and link layer protocol: in particular the
overt packet rate information being transmitted, predictable rate se-
lection mechanism, performance anomaly caused by the equiproba-
bility of transmissions among all nodes regardless of the data rates
being employed, and the lack of interference differentiation from
poor link quality by IEEE802.11 RAAs. In this work, we present
algorithms thatdetermine optimal jamming strategiesagainst RAAs
for a given jamming budget, and experimentally demonstrate the
efﬁciency of these smart jamming attacks, which can be orders of
magnitude more efﬁcient than naive jamming. For example, in the
case of SampleRate, eight reactive jamming pulses every second
are sufﬁcient to achieve the same network throughput degradation
achieved by a periodic jammer with the jamming energy cost 100
times higher. Some of the RAAs react even worse to smart jam-
ming attacks; ONOE in particular suffers from the phenomenon of
congestion collapse where the nodes fail to recover from the low-
est data rate even after the jammer stops jamming. At the end, we
summarize fundamental reasons behind such RAA vulnerabilities
and propose a preliminary set of mitigation techniques. We leave
the experimental demonstration of the efﬁciency of the proposed
mitigation mechanisms for future work.
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1. INTRODUCTION
With rapid advancement and standardization of wireless technol-
ogy, wireless LANs (WLANs) are now ubiquitous, providing the
last mile access to the Internet. Security issues in WLANs, how-
ever, remain a serious concern and have attracted a lot of attention
in the research community. Among various security attacks, jam-
ming continues to be an effective exploit that can deny or degrade
service to legitimate WLAN users. A knowledgeable attacker can
intermittently inject signals into the medium and occupy wireless
channels, interfere with regular trafﬁc and disrupt WLAN opera-
tions effectively at minimal jamming cost. Existing jammers rely
on high transmission power and frequent injection of jamming sig-
nals to disrupt communication. Such a strategy is inefﬁcient in
terms of jamming power consumption; furthermore, increases the
risk of trivial jammer detection due to high power jamming and/or
frequent packet injections into the communication medium.
In this paper, we study the resiliency of IEEE802.11 rate adap-
tation algorithms (RAAs) against smart jamming attacks. To this
end, we ﬁrst consider the design of an optimal jammer targeting
the vulnerabilities of IEEE802.11 RAAs. The function of the RAA
is to enable WLAN users to adaptively choose the best transmit-
ting rate according to current wireless link conditions in order to
achieve the maximum throughput possible. Intuitively, lower rates
are more reliable and suitable for poor channel conditions and the
higher data rates for good channel conditions. It is well known that
most common implementations of RAA in use today cannot dis-
tinguish between the causes of packet failures due to the poor link
quality and due to the interference/collisions. If a jammer injects 
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Figure 1: (a) Time it takes to drop the rate to the lowest value, (b) Time it takes to recover to the optimal data rate.
pulses so as to interfere with the regular packets, the legitimate user
will assume that the link quality is poor for the current transmission
rate, and will decrease the rate to a lesser value. What makes it
worse is that once the jamming stops, the recovery period before at-
taining the optimal data rate for communication in these RAAs are
much longer than the time it takes for them to adaptively lower the
data rate due to collision or malicious interference. Figure 1 shows
such a phenomenon that is predominant in the case of two of the
most commonly used RAAs: SampleRate and ONOE. Overall, this
is one of the reasons that the IEEE802.11 wireless network suffers
from signiﬁcant performance degradation even with an oblivious
jammer injecting small pulses intermittently into the channel.
IEEE-802.11 WLAN also suffers from a performance anomaly
where the poorest link dictates the throughput of the whole network
sharing a common channel. This phenomenon was ﬁrst reported
in [11]. The reason for this is because all participating nodes have
the same probability of transmitting at any instant of IEEE802.11
communication independent ofthe data rates being used atdifferent
links. However, this behavior leads to an efﬁcient adversary attack
called the reﬂection attack where the jammer targets one particular
link and jams to bring down its data rate, while in effect causing
the whole network throughput to suffer heavily as shown in Fig-
ure 2. Figure 2(a) depicts an experimental setting with multiple
links sharing a common channel and a reactive jammer present in
the medium that selectively jams all the non-1Mbps trafﬁc of some
link, li. Without the loss of generality, we pick D as the victim
link for the experiment. Figure 2(b) clearly shows that the im-
pact of jamming victim link D trickles down to non-victim links
(A,B,C,D) in terms of the average throughput degradation and
ultimately the whole network throughput is affected even though
only a single link is being targeted by the jammer.
Hence, in this paper, we carefully analyze the vulnerabilities in-
herent to IEEE802.11 MAC and RAAs, and design optimal jam-
mer exploits to maximize the throughput reduction at a minimal
jamming cost. The main contributions of our work are as follow:
• We ﬁrst analyze three widely-used RAAs – ONOE, AMRR,
SampleRate and derive the cost of jamming in each case to
achieve a desired throughput reduction (Section 5).
• We then classify RAAs based on their rate selection strate-
gies and use thatframework to design optimaljamming strate-
gies that exploit the RAA-speciﬁc behavior. We show that
our jamming cost analysis can be used to efﬁciently design a
smart jammer that targets speciﬁc packets and optimize the
reduction in throughput when subjected to a jamming energy
budget. We also present a technique that applies to the case
when jamming costs cannot be estimated (Section 4).
• Wecarefully analyze theweaknesses inherent in theIEEE802.11
MAC and Link layer protocols that allow jammers to be ex-
tremely efﬁcient with their jamming.
• We build a testbed comprising of the USRP/GNURadio plat-
form and present a comprehensive experimental evaluation
of three RAAs mentioned above and the RAA used in Mi-
crosoft Windows XP in the presence of smart jamming. Our
experimental results conﬁrm that a smart reactive jammer
can maintain links at a low data rate (1 Mbps) at a minimal
jamming cost (jamming only 5   8 packets/s) (Section 6).
• Finally, we propose a set of preliminary mitigation mecha-
nisms with their implementation left for future work (Sec-
tion 7).
Paper Outline: In Section 2, we review the related work. In
Section 3, we provide the background for our work and discuss in-
herent weaknesses of IEEE802.11. Subsequently, we discuss our
system model and the framework for cost analysis of IEEE802.11
RAA jamming in Sections 4 and 5. Finally, in Section 6, we evalu-
ate the proposed smart jamming attacks using a carefully designed
real-world experimentation test-bed. We present the details of the
implementation and evaluation methodology. At the end, we con-
clude with the discussions on the mitigation techniques and future
work in Sections 7 and 8.
2. RELATED WORK
Anti-jamming techniques have been studied extensively for de-
cades [30]. Most of the earlier mechanisms focused on protect-
ing physical layer of the wireless communication and made use
of spread-spectrum techniques, directional antennas, and coding
schemes. At the time, most of the wireless communication were
not packetized nor networked. Reliable communication in the pres-
ence of adversaries have regained signiﬁcant interest in the last few
years. New attacks and thus the need for more complex applica-
tions and deployment environments have emerged. Several specif-
ically crafted attacks and counter-attacks have been proposed for:
packetized wireless data networks [20,22], multiple access resolu-
tion in the presence of adversaries [1–3], multi-hop networks [20,(a) Reﬂection Attack
Victim Link Non-victim Links
Avg. Throughput (Pre-jamming) 16.1 Mbps 15.4 Mbps
Avg. Throughput (Post-jamming) 1.02 Mbps 0.96 Mbps
Data Rate (Pre-jamming) 54 Mbps 54 Mbps
Data Rate (Post-jamming) 1 Mbps 54 Mbps
(b) Performance Anomaly
Figure 2: Smart Jamming Strategy that exploits the
IEEE802.11 Performance Anomaly.
33,43], broadcast communication [8,10,32], cross-layer attacks [21],
and navigation information broadcast systems [27]. However, very
little work has been done on protecting rate adaptation algorithms
against adversarial attacks. Rate adaptation plays an important role
in IEEE802.11 as the link quality in a WLAN is often highly dy-
namic. In recent years, a number of algorithms for rate adaptation
have been proposed in literature [7,12,14,17,25,26,41,42], and
few have been used in Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) prod-
ucts as well [5,19]. Their main idea is to estimate channel quality
and adjust the transmission rate accordingly. Most of the exist-
ing mechanisms estimate channel quality using some metrics, such
as statistics of packet successes and failures, PHY metrics like the
SNR, probe packets etc. Based on where this information is col-
lected, we can classify RAAsinto two main categories: theﬁrstcat-
egory is sender-based where the RAAs determine the rates solely
based on the metrics collected and calculated at the sender side (ir-
respective of the receiver feedback/information) [5,15,19,26,42]
and the second category is receiver-based where the algorithm ex-
plicitly uses feedbacks from the receiver to select a data transmis-
sion rate [9,12,17,28,29]. Regardless, most of these algorithms are
vulnerable to even the simplest of jamming attacks mainly because
these algorithms fail todifferentiate between interference caused by
link quality and collisions/fading/malicious interference, and there-
fore causing the collected statistical information to be biased by
the interference making them an inaccurate assessment of the link
quality. [17] tries to differentiate between the losses due to collision
and link conditions using RTS/CTS exchange. The basic intuition
in their work is that with the RTS/CTS enabled, the packet loss is
certainly caused by the link quality. Robust Rate Adaptation Algo-
rithm in [42] adopts a similar idea to obtain more accurate statistics
of packet loss. However, these approaches cannot mitigatethe issue
of (malicious) interference caused by jamming because the adver-
sary may not obey the RTS/CTS policy, e.g., the jammer can jam
the data packet following an RTS/CTS exchange.
[28] proposes to let the receiver send corrupted packets back to
the sender to help determine the cause of the packet failure. How-
ever, it does not help the WLAN under jamming attacks either be-
cause, (a) the interference caused by jamming may have different
characteristics from the interference caused by the channel noise.
So it is difﬁcult for the proposed scheme to detect the existence of
the jamming signals, and (b) the adversary may jam the feedback
packets from the receiver so that the sender has no sufﬁcient infor-
mation for analysis.
To the best of our knowledge, [23] is the ﬁrst work to consider
RAA jamming. They demonstrate that in fact existing RAAs are
highly vulnerable to jamming. They show that ﬁxed data rate net-
work outperforms most of the rate-adaptive network in the presence
of naive jamming. Their work, however, assumes an unconstrained
jammer and does not consider the case where the jammers, similar
to the senders and receivers, are resource constrained. In contrast,
our paper focuses on the robustness of RAAs against attacks that
speciﬁcally target the speciﬁc rate adaptation vulnerabilities and
IEEE802.11 weakness and efﬁciently reduce the network through-
put within their limited jamming budget. Furthermore, their anti-
jamming mechanism depends on ﬁguring out correct threshold to
distinguish between scenarios of jamming and no-jamming, and
hence to be able to switch between using RAA and ﬁxed data rate
as triggered by their threshold cutoff. This scheme of calculating
the appropriate threshold can easily be exploited by a smart jam-
mer. Their work, therefore, only provides resiliency against naive
jamming. Our work, on the other hand, discusses the mitigation
of vulnerabilities at the IEEE802.11 MAC and Link Layer to keep
smart jammers from launching efﬁcient denial of service attacks.
Lastly, [6] considers intelligent jamming that exploits the per-
formance anomaly in IEEE802.11 WLAN. They propose ways to
detect and alleviate the impact of such jamming under their setup.
Their work, however, like [23] only considers inefﬁcient jammers
that blindly send intermittent or periodic signals without exploiting
the publicly known protocol information. Therefore, their jammer
requires being physically placed in the vicinity of the victim node
such that it does not jam a region and instead jams only the targeted
victim node. Jamming a region is detrimental to the jammer’s per-
formance not only in terms of jamming cost but also it would lead
to easy detection. In contrast, our work considers reactive jammers
that are not only channel aware but speciﬁcally ﬁlter out the victim
nodes trafﬁc, and focus all of their jamming on the packets of the
victim node as shown in Figure 2.
3. IEEE802.11 MAC AND RAAS
In this section, we brieﬂy introduce the speciﬁc RAAs that we
analyze in this paper, and discuss the inherent weaknesses of IEEE-
802.11 MAC and RAAs that allow for smart jamming attacks.
3.1 Background
We have examined four RAAs in our experiments. The ﬁrstthree
are included in MadWiﬁ driver with source codes and the fourth
one is the Atheros Windows XP driver for which details are not
available. The following is a brief description of the Madwiﬁ (most
popular open source driver) implementation of the RAAs [36]:
SampleRate: SampleRate is the default RAA used in Madwiﬁ
driver [5,35,36]. It maintains the statistical information for each
data rate which includes the average transmitting time (ATT) (con-
sidering the retries) and the number of consecutive failures. The
algorithm picks the rate with the lowest ATT for transmission. Af-
ter every 10 packets, SampleRate randomly picks a different data
rate for probing to update its packet rate statistics. This allows for
rate update even when the current rate is performing with no fail-
ures. The ratesbe with more than 3 consecutive failures are not
eligible for probing (black-listed). After a 2 second period, all the
black-listed rates are reconsidered for probing if their theoreticalATT with no retransmissions is better than the ATT of the current
rate in use. In non-malicious environment, SampleRate quickly
converges to the optimal data rate.
ONOE: ONOE is the RAA developed by the Madwiﬁ develop-
ers [37]. ONOE monitors the history of packet successes and fail-
ures within a window of 1 second, and uses a credit system where
it increases the credit value by 1 if more than 90% of packets have
succeeded during the last window, otherwise decreases the credit
by 1. When the credit reaches 10, the sender increases the trans-
mitting rate to the next higher rate. If all the packets succeed during
the last monitor window, then the sender directly increases the rate.
If each packet fails at least once on average, then the sender de-
creases the rate to the next lower rate. Therefore, Onoe is more
conservative in its step-ups as it takes at least 10 seconds before
it decides to increase the data rate, whereas, it steps down pretty
quickly if the link quality deteriorates.
AMRR: Adaptive Multi Rate Retry is a two-stage RAA, which
is basically an extension of ARF (Auto Rate Fallback) with multi-
rate retransmissions [19]. The main idea behind this RAA is that
the short-term ﬂuctuations are dealt via multi-rate retries (MRR)
implemented at the driver, and the long termrate adaptation is taken
care of by applying a basic mechanism where the sender adjusts the
rate upwards after 10 consecutive ACKs, and adjusts the rate down-
wards after 2 consecutive failures. The MRR is deﬁned as a tuple
(r0/c0, r1/c1, r2/c2, r3/c3), where the retry rates (r0,r 1,r 2,r 3) are
set to (thecurrentrate, onelevellower bit   rate, twolevel
lowerbit rate, thelowestbaserate)and the retrycounts(c0,c 1
,c 2,c 3) are set to (1,1,1,1) respectively. The more details on the
multi rate retries for AMRR, ONOE and SampleRate can be found
in [18].
3.2 WeaknessesofIEEE802.11MACand RAAs
There are four major weaknesses in existing rate adaptation algo-
rithms used in combination with IEEE802.11 Link and MAC layer
protocols for WiFi communication:
• Overt Packet Rate Information: The IEEE802.11 standard
makes the rate of the current packet being transmitted ex-
plicitly available in the SIGNAL ﬁeld of the PLCP header
(encoded and modulated with a robust base rate). This al-
lows an adversary equipped with a smart radio to quickly
identify the current packet rate and jam it before the end of
the transmission. Even without the PLCP header informa-
tion, a smart jammer can recover the rate of a packet by (1)
analyzing the I and Q signal constellation to derive the cur-
rent modulation of the packet (e.g., BPSK, QPSK, 16QAM,
64QAM for 802.11ag), and (2) attempting the error correc-
tion schemes (e.g., 1/2, 2/3, 3/4 for 802.11g). The combina-
tion of modulation and coding scheme uniquely identiﬁes the
packet rate in a 802.11 communication. Furthermore, distin-
guishing between DSSS and OFDM are even easier when
using the spectrum signature of the frame preamble. This al-
lows for an easy detection of current data rate in use by an
adversary.
• Predictable rate selection rules: The behavior of existing
rate adaptation algorithms is very predictable. SampleRate,
for example, sends probes periodically at the interval of ev-
ery ten packets with a different data rate. Furthermore, the
Madwiﬁ (most widely used linux driver) implementation of
SampleRate makes it even more predictable by using deter-
ministic rules to pick data rates for probing. Similarly, the
credit mechanisms of ONOE is easily track-able by an adver-
sary, and so is the exponential backoff mechanism of AMRR.
• Equi-probable transmissions: The IEEE802.11 standard gives
equal opportunity to all the nodes to transmit, independent
of their link quality (therefore the data rates). This allows
adversaries to mount reﬂection attack, where a victim node
is targeted for attack and forced into selecting a low data
rate. The victim now monopolizes the channel, therefore
indirectly blocking/delaying other nodes from transmitting.
This can transform moderate load into saturation trafﬁc load,
and possibly a self-sustaining low-rateselection phenomenon
as seen in the case of ONOE. We call this jammer-triggered
congestion collapse. We discuss this in detail in Section 5.
• Lack of Interference Differentiation: Radio receivers are in-
capable of differentiating betweenmaliciousinterference (e.g.,
jamming) and non-malicious interference such as direct col-
lisions (two nodes’ MAC backoff timer expiring at the same
time), hidden terminal problem, or noise from spatial reuse
of channels. This gets even harder to do for moving nodes
with dynamic link quality due to multi-path fading and envi-
ronmental changes.
All these weaknesses in IEEE802.11 MAC and RAAs allow for
very efﬁcient and effective attacks by an adversary spending mini-
mum jamming cost.
4. IEEE802.11 RAA JAMMING
In this section, we present our model for studying RAA jamming
attacks and devise optimal attack against rate adaptation given a
ﬁxed energy budget for the jammer.
4.1 System Model and Problem Formulation
4.1.1 Network Model
We consider a WLAN with a set U of users who share the same
wireless channel and are all within one another’s communication
range. We assume there are n directional communication links
given by the set L = {l1,l 2,...,l n} among all users. Let D =
{di > 0|1   i   n} denote the set of expected trafﬁc demands
on links L. For a saturated network, di = d for all links li. Let m
represent the available number of transmitting data rates for each
user and R denote the set of data rates in ascending order:
R = {r1,r 2,...,r m}  i,j,i < j   ri <r j.
Now, we use ti   R to represent the transmission rate used on the
link li (i.e, by the sender). Thus, T = {t1,...,t n} represents the
array of rates used on the n links respectively. The overall through-
put of the WLAN can be approximately expressed as
 (D,T)=
P
i d
P
i
d
ti
.
    (D,T)=
1
P
i
1
ti
Note that L, D and T may vary over time. Here, we assume that
they are stable for an epoch t.
4.1.2 Adversary Model
We assume the adversary is equipped with a radio device oper-
ating on the 802.11 frequency band that can receive signals from
the air and inject signals to it. Under our model, the jammer uses
a ﬁxed transmission power to generate a short pulse signal that is
strong enough to jam a packet if hit. During our experimental eval-
uation, weobserved thata jamming pulse as smallas22µs in length(a) Network Setup (b) Timeline Graph
Figure 3: Block Diagram: A is the sender, B is the receiver, C is the jammer (C1 and C2 are its sensing and jamming counterparts).
can make the concurrently transmitted packet undecodable even if
it is being sent using the most reliable rate by the sender. Addition-
ally, we assume that the adversary has a bounded energy source
which limits it to injecting at most B jamming packets during any
epoch. Thus, the objective of the adversary is to jam the WLAN
with at most B packets and alter the transmitting rates, T, to a new
set T
  such that  (D,T
 ) is minimized.
Figure 3 depicts the network and the adversary model of our sys-
tem.
4.2 Sketch of an Attack
We divide each jamming attack into two phases, an initial phase
and a maintenance phase. The ﬁrst phase is to bring down the
transmitting rates on some links and the second phase is to keep
those links at the low rate for the duration of the epoch given a
ﬁxed jamming budget.
4.2.1 Initial Phase
This phase is a short period compared to the maintenance phase
and the epoch. We assume that prior to the start of the initial phase
the adversary has monitored the trafﬁc in the air and obtained some
information about the WLAN, such as the identiﬁer of each user
and data link, trafﬁc demands (length of the payload in each link),
and current rates. In this initial phase, the adversary ﬁrst selects a
set of victim links and calculates a target rate for each of them that
is no more than the current rate. Then, if the target rate for a victim
link is smaller than the current rate, the adversary intensively jams
the packets transferred on the victim link to trigger the RAA to
decrease the data rate. The jamming in this phase stops when the
rate on each victim link reaches the target level. Our goal in this
phase is to bring down the transmitting rates on the victim links to
the target rates in a quick and efﬁcient way. As we will see later, it
may not be necessary to jam all the packets on the victim links to
achieve this phenomenon.
4.2.2 Maintenance Phase
After the initial phase, each victim link’s rate has already been
decreased to the adversary’s target rate. However, additional jam-
ming is needed to prevent those links from recovering to their pre-
vious higher rates as more packets are being delivered. We call this
the maintenance phase. In thisphase, the adversary selectively jams
the packets transferred on the victim links so that the RAA does not
increase the rates. Compared to the initial phase, the jamming in
the maintenance phase is less frequent, but it lasts for a longer pe-
riod (the remainder of the epoch) depending on the budget and the
goal of the jammer.
In this two-phase attack design, the challenge is to determine
which victim links to invest the energy on and achieving their cor-
responding target rates. In the rest of this section, we present al-
gorithms to solve this problem. We look at two scenarios differ-
entiated based on the awareness or the oblivion of the adversary
regarding the RAA being employed by communicating links.
Fig.4 shows the performance of RAAjamming in terms ofabove
described phase costs for each of the four RAAs (SampleRate,
ONOE, AMRR, Windows RAA).
4.3 Optimal Algorithm for Known RAA
We ﬁrst consider the case where the jammer is aware of the RAA
being used for each link in the network.
1 With the RAA informa-
tion, we can derive two important parameters of the jamming cost
spent in the initial phase and maintenance phase. We call them ini-
tial cost and maintenance cost, which are deﬁned as the number of
jamming pulses needed in the initial and maintenance phases un-
der our model respectively. Let ic(r,r
 ,k) denote the initial jam-
ming cost of degrading the transmitting rate on link lk from r to r
 
(ic(r,r
 ,k)=0if r   r
 ). Let mc(r,k) denote the maintenance
cost of keeping link lk at rate r for the duration of an epoch. In the
next section, we will show how to calculate them ic(r,r
 ,k) and
mc(i,k) for a particular RAA. Here, we assume that they are given
parameters for the problem.
Given the demand D, and the set of initial transmission rates T,
our goal is to ﬁnd the best jamming strategy to yield a new set of
rates T
  and maintain it for the epoch t within the jammer budget
B
2. Thus, our problem can be formulated as
minimize  (D,T
 )   maximize
X 1
r 
i
s.t.
X
 k
(ic(tk,t
 
k,k)+mc(t
 
k,k))   B
We propose Algorithm 1 to ﬁnd the best victim links and their
target rates. In the algorithm, Opt(x) represents the maximum ob-
jective wecan achieve withcost budgetxand T
x = {t
x
1,t
x
2,...,t
x
k}
is the corresponding resulting set of rates, i.e., link lk uses rate t
x
k
in the optimal result.
Initially,Optis set to the current value of
P 1
ti. The algorithm is
a dynamic program that incrementally ﬁlls the array Opt(x). Lines
4-17 enumerate all possible choices for the last jamming action
which can be represented as a <l k,r,r
  > tuple, i.e., the last jam-
ming to decrease the rate on lk from r to r
 . In line 7, y represents
the budget cost for all the previous jamming actions. <l k,r,r
  >
is valid only if y>0 and given that the jamming link lk was us-
ing rate r. Among all possibilities for the last jamming action, we
1Note each link may use a different RAA.
2Note that while demands might be difﬁcult to predict, it can be
assumed to be uniform in saturated conditions.1Mbps
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Figure 4: Performance of RAAs under Jamming
Algorithm 1 Optimal Jamming for Known RAA
1: Opt(0)  
P
di
 (D,T), T
0   T
2: for x =1to B do
3: Opt(x)   Opt(x   1),T
x   T
x 1
4: for all link lk do
5: for r in R such that r   tk do
6: for r
  in R such that r
  <rdo
7: y   x   ic(r,r
 ,k)   mc(r
 ,k)
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pick the one that can maximize the objective and record the max-
imum value in Opt(x) (lines 11-12). T
x is also updated to keep
track of the victim links and their target rates. Finally, T
B contains
the best target rates for each victim link and Opt(B) is the optimal
value of the objective function. The complexity of Algorithm 1 is
O(B · n · m
2).
4.4 Greedy Algorithm for Unknown RAA
If the RAA in the WLAN is unknown, the adversary may not
be able to calculate the initial cost and maintenance cost. An al-
ternative way is to run a short training session where the adversary
conducts jamming trialson each link at different rates and estimates
the initial cost and maintenance cost based on the observation. If
the training session cannot provide a consistent and accurate esti-
mation, we propose the following greedy heuristic for the reactive
jammer.
At all times, for each link li the adversary maintains an estimate
gmci of the cost of maintaining the link at its current rate for the
duration of the epoch. It also maintains the total cost gic incurred
thus far in bringing the rates of the victim links down to the current
rates. Initially, gmci for all i and gic are set to zero.
To determine the next victim link, the adversary computes, for
each link li, the degradation in throughput, GD(i), when its rate is
decreased by a level (assuming it is not already at the lowest level).
GD(i)=d ·
„
1
p(ti)
 
1
ti
«
,
where for a given rate r, p(r) is the largest rate smaller than r in
R; if r equals r1, then p(r) is also r1. If gic+
P
i gmci <B , the
adversary selects the link li with the maximum value of GD(i) as
a victim link and jams the link until li starts to use p(ti). The cost
gic is accordingly updated to include the number of packets used
in the preceding step. Then, the adversary updates the estimate
gmci by simply jamming packets higher than the current rate and
extrapolating the cost over the epoch duration.
The adversary repeats this process to identify multiple victim
links for the epoch until the budget is exhausted. The greedy algo-
rithm is summarized below.Algorithm 2 Greedy Algorithm for Unknown RAA
1: gic =0 ,  ig m c i =0 , J = {}
2: while B   gic 
P
i gmci > 0 do
3: Pick link li where i = argmaxGD(i); if no such link ex-
ists, then exit the loop
4: J   J + {li}
5: Jam li until B
  packets are injected or rate of li reduced by
one level (assume x packets are injected)
6: Monitor a time unit to update the cost estimate gmci for
maintaining li at current rate for epoch
7: gic   gic+ x
8: end while
9: Launch maintenance jamming on all links in J
We can prove that the greedy algorithm is, in fact, optimal if the
following two conditions hold true:
1. RAA satisﬁes a special property: the forward difference
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where 1   i   j   n
2. The maintenance cost is uniform across all links and rate lev-
els.
The ﬁrst condition implies that the incremental performance degra-
dation increases with a decrease in rate level. This applies to all the
IEEE802.11 variants studied in this paper. In the next section, we
show that the second condition also approximately holds for all of
the RAAs studied in this paper.
5. JAMMING COST FOR KNOWN RAA
In this section, we analyze the initial and maintenance costs for
jamming RAAs. As discussed in the preceding section, an adver-
sary equipped with such an analysis can efﬁciently design an op-
timal jammer. Here we only consider the three RAAs – ONOE,
AMRR, and SampleRate – used in our experiments. For other
RAAs, similaranalysis can beconducted. Afteranalyzing the costs,
we also study the impact of “self-collisions” – collisions arising due
to contention among the transmitting stations. The phenomenon
where self-collisions cause the network throughput to degrade (or
even cause zero throughput – collapse) is called congestion col-
lapse [16]. We show that in some cases, the adversary can take ad-
vantage of self-collisions and smart-jam to trigger congestion col-
lapse, which in turn signiﬁcantly reduces the Phase-II maintenance
cost.
5.1 Initial Cost
For the initialphase cost analysis, we assume that the adversary’s
goal isto quickly bring down the rates on the victimlinks. Thus, the
general strategy would be to intensively jam all the packets whose
rates are higher than the target rate. We analyze the initial cost for
the three speciﬁc RAAs as follows.
ONOE: To make ONOE decrease the current rate to the next
lower rate, the average number of transmissions per packet (includ-
ing retransmissions) needs to be more than 1 during a monitor win-
dow (1second). Therefore, in order to decrease the rate by Llevels,
the adversary has to jam an average of one transmission per packet
for each of the L windows. Hence, the cost would be L packets
3Sequence of differences between two successive rate reciprocals.
within a monitor window. Note that ONOE counts the total num-
ber of retries, thus jamming the retransmissions is also effective.
AMRR: AMRR decreases the rate when it encounters two con-
secutive failures. Thus, the initial cost for AMRR to decrease the
rate by L levels is 2 · L.
SampleRate: The analysis for SampleRate is more complicated
as its behavior is less predictable compared to ONOE and AMRR.
When decreasing the rate, SampleRate does not always decrease to
the next lower rate. Here, we estimate an upper bound on the initial
cost. SampleRate has a black-list policy that any rates with more
than 3 consecutive failures will not be considered as a candidate
for a period of 2 seconds. Therefore, an effective way for the initial
phase is to black-list all the rates higher than the target rates. As-
suming there are L
  rates higher than the target rate, the initial cost
for SampleRate is at most 4 · L
 .
5.2 Maintenance Cost
In general, the value of t depends on the type and value of jam-
mer budget. In Section 6, we will discuss budget types when de-
scribing the evaluation metrics. For now, we assume that t is inﬁ-
nite.
ONOE: In the case of ONOE, the low data rate can be main-
tained by keeping the credit value constant. During a monitor win-
dow, if we jam 10% of the packets, the credit will be decreased
by 1. Then in the next window, we can jam only one packet (no
failure will directly trigger the rate increase), and let the credit in-
crease back to the previous value. By repeating this process, we
can prevent ONOE from ever increasing the credit value to 10, thus
keeping the rate unchanged. Assuming during each window the
sender sends roughly the same amount of packets, the maintenance
cost for ONOE is to jam 5% of the packets.
AMRR: In AMRR, the rate is increased after 10 consecutive
successes. Thus, jamming one packet after 9 successes will ensure
that AMRR continues to use the same rate. So the maintenance
cost for AMRR is to jam 10% of the packets.
SampleRate: SampleRate probes other potentially-better rates
after every 10 packets and update the statistics for that rate. If we
jam all the probes, the transmitting rate stays the same. Therefore,
the maintenance cost for SampleRate is also to jam 10% of the
packets.
We verify these values later in the evaluation section.
5.3 Impact of Self Collisions on Maintenance
Cost
The WLAN’s regular trafﬁc also generates self-collision among
all the contending stations. These self collisions may keep some
RAAsfrom increasing thetransmission rate, especially when trafﬁc
demands are high. This would lead to a signiﬁcant reduction in
maintenance cost for the jammer, speciﬁcally in some cases, we
will see that this may even lead to a zero maintenance cost for the
adversary (the jammer triggering the congestion collapse).
In this subsection, we take ONOE as a case study to analyze the
impact of the self collisions under saturated trafﬁc conditions. We
use PI to indicate the probability of interference caused by self
collisions. According to Bianchi’s model [4], we can estimate PI
given the number of contenting stations, n. Here, we omit the de-
tails and list the calculated PI for some values of n in the following
table.
n 2 3 5 10
PI 0.057 0.1044 0.1779 0.2894
Recall that ONOE maintains a history of packet successes and
failures within a monitor window of 1 second. It increases thecredit by 1 if more than 90% of packets succeed; otherwise it de-
creases the credit by 1. When the credit reaches 10, the sender
increases the transmission rate to the next higher rate. Suppose that
during a window of a second, the sender has transmitted s packets.
The number of successes in this period is a random variable X that
follows a binomial distributionX   B(s,1 PI). The probability
of increasing the credit is thus PincC = Pr(X   0.9   s).
Now, we calculate the probability PincR that the rate increases.
There are two events that can cause an increase in data rate: all
transmissions succeed during a window, or the credit reaches 10.
For a particular window, let us denote the probability of all suc-
cesses as P
s
suc. In practice, s is sufﬁciently large. Hence, P
s
suc is
close to 0. Therefore, we focus on calculating Pcredit deﬁned as
the probability that the credit reaches 10. Let P(t,i) be the proba-
bility that after t monitor windows, the credit value is i( i<10).
Initially, P(0,0) = 1. For i   8,
P(t,i)=P(t 1,i 1) PincC +P(t 1,i+1) (1 PincC)
For i =9 ,
P(t,i)=P(t   1,i  1)   PincC
The probability of increasing the rate by the credit value reaching
10 after t windows is,
Pcredit(t)=P(t,10) = P(t   1,9)   PincC
Thus, PincR   Pcredit(t)=P(t   1,9)   PincC.
Using the values of PI from the table above, we can see that
ONOE is highly vulnerable to self collision. Even with only 3 con-
tending nodes in the channel, PincR turns out to be less than 0.1%.
Therefore, in a network with size n   3, the maintenance cost for
ONOE is reduced by at least a factor of 10 due to self collisions.
In summary, this analysis concludes that some RAAs such as
ONOE do not perform well under saturated network conditions
which allows the adversary to launch more efﬁcient jamming at-
tacks with much smaller maintenance cost.
6. IMPLEMENTATIONANDEVALUATION
In this section, we ﬁrstdiscuss the details of our novel testbed de-
signed toimplement smartjamming attacks againstdifferent RAAs:
the hardware and software components, test-bed setup, the jammer
implementation, evaluation methodology and performance metrics.
Then, we evaluate the efﬁciency of the attacks and validate the
claims made in Section 4 and 5 using results from real world ex-
periments.
6.1 Testbed Topology
For our experiments, we only consider a single link network
since our earlier study (Figure 2) show that targeting a single vic-
tim link for jamming can cause the whole network throughput to
degrade effectively with minimal jamming cost (reﬂection attack).
6.1.1 System Layout
Our testbed consists of two communication nodes, a sender and a
receiver, and the adversary as shown in Figure 3. The sender sends
UDP trafﬁc to the receiver to saturate the network. The attacker
constantly sniffs the channel and when it sees a sender packet des-
tined for the receiver node of interest, it jams the packet before the
transmission is over. For this to happen, the jamming packet must
overlap with the sender packet at the receiver side as shown in the
time line graph (See Figure 3). Figure 5 depicts the actual test-bed
setup we use to run experiments.
6.1.2 Basic Hardware and Software Components
The hardware components of our testbed includes two PCs, (A)
a sender node and (B) a receiver node, (C) jammer host, (D) jam-
mer radio and RF-cables and splitters/combiners. We chose to use
the RF-cabled setup for our experiments because of following two
reasons:
• To achieve reproducible results
• To isolate our testbed from the laboratory network (this in-
cludes preventing the jammer from affecting lab network)
All of the above would be hard to achieve in an open medium.
Note that operating the nodes with antennas in an open medium
will only make the jamming more effective because of additional
collisions/losses due to the propagation environment and external
trafﬁc.
Thesoftware components of our testbed include software deﬁned
radio (SDR) for signal processing, a trafﬁc generator, a trafﬁc snif-
fer tool, and the open source wireless card driver. Later, we will
see why the use of open source wireless driver is necessary for the
implementation of our reactive jammer.
Testbed Hardware Speciﬁcation: Our jammer radio is a USRP
board [38], whichconsists of amotherboard and two daughter boards.
Each of the daughter boards are capable of operating independently
as a transceiver. We use the ﬁrst daughter board to sniff the chan-
nel as the jammer’s sensing counterpart that triggers the second
daughter board used to jam the channel. We chose D-Link WDA-
1320 PCI express wireless cards for our experiments. They run
on Atheros AR5212 chipsets that are compatible with open source
Madwiﬁ driver [36].
Component Version/Model
Host CPUs Intel Core2 6300
Jammer Radio Motherboard USRP1
Jammer Radio Daughter boards RFX-2400
Sender and Receiver Wireless Cards D-Link WDA-1320 PCI express
Splitter/Combiner HyperLink SC2402
RF-Cables L-com RG174 RF-Coaxial Cable
Table 1: Experimental Testbed Hardware Speciﬁcations.
Testbed Software Speciﬁcation: We use open source GNURa-
dio [39] as the Software Deﬁned Radio (SDR) that runs on USRP
to implement fully reactive jammers that are channel aware and
can sense and jam the channel within a quick turn around time, if
it decides to do so on a per packet basis. Iperf is used as the traf-
ﬁc generator, and Wireshark as the receiver sniffer/analyzer in our
testbed.
Component Version/Model
Host OS Ubuntu v9.10
Sender Trafﬁc Generator Iperf v2.0.4
Receiver Sniffer/Analyzer Wireshark v1.2.7
Jammer SDR GNURadio v3.3.0
Sender and Receiver Wireless Driver Madwiﬁ v0.9.4
Table 2: Experimental Testbed Software Speciﬁcations.
6.1.3 Types of Jammers
In our experiments, we consider the following four kinds of jam-
mers:
• Continuous Jammer: This jammer produces a continuous
signal at a speciﬁed power level. We use this kind of jammer
to introduce channel noise into our testbed.AB
C
D
E
Figure 5: Experimentation Test-bed: (A) Sender, (B) Receiver, (C) Jammer-host, (D) USRP+Splitters+RF-cables, (E) Analyzer.
• PeriodicJammer: This jammer produces a periodic pulse of
ﬁxed size enough to destroy a packet if hit. The idle interval
is the input to this kind of jammer and is based on the jammer
budget as well as the desired network throughput.
• Memoryless Jammer: This jammer is similar to the peri-
odic jammer, except the length of the period is decided using
a memoryless distribution, the mean of which is the input
parameter for the jammer.
• Reactive Jammer: This jammer is channel aware and jams
reactively using the information itdecodes from theIEEE802.11
PLCP header. The implementation of this kind of jammer
requires more explanation, the details of which is provided
below.
6.1.4 Implementation of the Reactive Jammer
The reactive jammer has two counterparts as shown in Figure 3.
The main goal of this jammer is to be able to sniff all the pack-
ets in the medium (carried out by C1 counterpart), and jam the
packets destined for the receiver node of interest using an optimal
jamming strategy (carried out by the C2 counterpart). The snif-
fer’s job is to sniff all the packets in the channel, decode only the
PLCP IEEE802.11 header, which is always sent at the robust rate
of 1.0 Mbps (we disable short preambles), and make jamming deci-
sions on a per-packet-basis using the jamming algorithm described
in Section 4. The ultimate goal for all the jammers is to keep the
victim link at the the lowest data rate possible in the most efﬁcient
way which would result in an overall total network throughput re-
duction (reﬂection attack) and may even cause congestion collapse
making the optimal use of its jamming budget. This jammer is the
best of all the jammers described above.
Limitations: USRP has an inherent hardware limitation that
only allows USRPto sample at most 8MHz band. This is a problem
because IEEE802.11 communication uses 20MHz band. Further-
more, USRP uses USB to communicate with the host, which has
a bandwidth limitation of 32MB/sec. This causes a delay in the
order of milliseconds between sensing the channel, passing the in-
formation up to the host, host making the decision and asking the
USRP to send a jamming signal into the channel [38,39]. This is
ultimately the bottleneck in our testbed implementation of a fully
reactive jammer.
To mitigatethese limitations, we apply following remedies to our
experimental setup:
Remedy: First, with the choice of our hardware (USRP), the
jammer can only samples 8MHz band out of 20MHz band of WiFi
communication, in turn giving up on the quality of the received
samples. However, once the preamble (sent at 1 Mbps) is detected,
the jammer only have to decode the 802.11 PLCP header to extract
rate information needed for the jamming algorithms discussed in
Section 4. Note that this does not allow the jammer to differentiate
between the receivers (MAC address is not known from the PLCP
header). But, for the case of a single link network that we consider
in our experiment, this sufﬁces. If we were to run experiments with
reactive jamming in a multiple links scenario, we must improve on
our testbed hardware to be able to sample a larger band, and decode
more information off the packet (such as receiver MAC address) to
target the victim node for jamming.
With the setup shown in Figure 5, we can achieve the reaction
time (including the turnaround from sensing to jamming plus the
USB delay) of around 2ms. Obviously, this is not enough to be
able to jam higher rate packets, even if we set the packet size to
be 1470 bytes. To alleviate this issue, we modify the Madwiﬁ
driver to reduce 20MHz bandwidth of IEEE802.11 transmission to
5MHz. This makes the data packet transmission four times longer
than when sent using the normal 20MHz band. This allows us as
the jammer to jam high data-rate within our testbed. Note that this
modiﬁcation while allowing to complete our experiments does not
impact the IEEE802.11 MAC and RAA behavior. In our future
work, we plan on using better hardware that will make this prob-
lem go away so that we do not need the narrow band remedy.
6.1.5 Assumptions
We make following assumptions in our experimentation:
1. We use RF-cables and splitters/combiners in our experimen-
tation setup. We use continuous jammers to induce noise
into our emulation of a wireless channel. This type of setup
is typical for evaluating wireless communication systems and
achieve reproducible results using channel emulator [40].
2. We consider a single link scenario for the evaluation of the
reactive jammer. We focus on jamming a single node with
the idea that this would trigger the reﬂection attack on the
network with multiple links, thus optimizing the use of jam-
ming resources. In Figure 2, we run simple experiments in a
multiple link scenario, and show that reﬂection attack can be
easily executed.
6.2 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the actual performance of reactive
jamming against various RAAs. We also compare them with the
performance of an oblivious jammer against the same set of RAAswithin the same experimentation setup. We ﬁrst describe the ex-
perimentation methodology, the metrics used to evaluate the per-
formance, and then present the experimentation results at the end.
Experimentation Setup: We run our experiments in an RF-
cabled setup as described above and depicted in Figure 5. This
allowed us to isolate our testbed from the surrounding interference,
hence, we were able to achieve results that show very little vari-
ance. Each experiment runs for a speciﬁed set of parameters is
deﬁned by the sender continuously sending saturated trafﬁc for 50
second period. We repeat each experiment 10 times to eliminate the
margin of error, which is already very small for us. Since, the re-
transmissions from the sender are sent using MRR implemented at
the driver level (thus, not captured by the Wireshark running at the
sender side), we split the sender RF output and connect it to an ex-
tra node that sniffs all the retransmissions and logs all the rates used
and number of packets sent (retransmissions included) for analysis.
Parameters: The set of parameters used for experimental eval-
uation is provided below:
Parameter Setting
Packet Size 1470 bytes
Frequency 2.462 GHz (Channel 11)
Trafﬁc Type UDP
Trafﬁc Bandwidth 1MB
Noise Power -20 dBm
Table 3: Parameter Speciﬁcation
Performance Metrics: In Section 5, we describe Phase-I and
Phase-II costs as the initial and maintenance phase costs for the
jammer to trigger RAA to drop the data rate to the lowest level and
keep it there for a certain epoch t. Time parameter t of the mainte-
nance phase depends on the jammer budget. There are two possible
scenarios for the jammer budget assigned to the jammer, one that
sets the budget as the rate (X Joules per second), and another that
assigns total energy (Y Joules) to be used regardless of the time pe-
riod. Phase-I depends on this deﬁnition of the budget. If time is the
constraint, it make sense for the jammer to blindly jam all packets
and bring down the data rate abruptly, otherwise, it can optimize
the jamming energy used when there is no constraint on time spent
in achieving the Phase-I goal. This is why, we evaluate the Phase-I
cost in both scenarios (See Figure 6). Note that jamming all packets
may trigger easier jammer detection than jamming only the non-1
Mbps data trafﬁc.
In the following, we measure the performance of the jammer in
terms of packets jammed during Phase-I and Phase-II.
Evaluation Results:
1. Phase-I cost: This is the cost for the reactive jammer to bring
down the link to the lowest data rate (1Mbps). Figure 6 illus-
trates the cost for the two scenarios described above, one that
allows only 1Mbps to go through, and another that jams all
data-rate packets. As we can see, for the SampleRate, jam-
ming all but 1Mbps packets performs better than jamming all
the packets. This can be explained by the fact that in Sam-
pleRate, the multi rate retry parameters (r0,r 1,r 2,r 3)=
(r,1Mbps,1Mbps,1Mbps), and the total number of tries is
8 per packet. So, if the jammer jams all the packets, it has
to jam 9 packets per transmission. However, if the jammer
jams only non-1Mbps packets, it won’t have to jam so many
packets before SampleRate decides that 1Mbps data packets
are the only ones succeeding. For ONOE, it does not seem to
differ much either way, and for AMRR jamming all packets
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three different RAAs
performs better than jamming only the non-1Mbps packets.
These can be explained by the fact thatONOEcounts retrans-
mission failures the same way as it counts the original trans-
mission failure, and the MRR count for AMRR (4 retrans-
missions) is much smaller than SampleRate and ONOE. For
windows RAA, it seems that jamming all packets abruptly
brings the link down to 1Mbps.
2. Phase-II cost: This is the cost to maintain the link at 1Mbps.
Figure 7 illustrates Phase-II cost for the reactive jammer to
maintain RAAsat1Mbps. Thiseffectively supports our claim
that smart jammers can efﬁciently keep the network at a low
throughput with minimal jamming. As we can see, jam-
ming 8, 5, and 6 packets per second can cause SampleRate,
ONOE, and AMRR to maintain the network at the lowest
data-rate. We do not show the histogram for Windows RAA
because, we observed that it is impossible to maintain Win-
dows RAAat 1Mbps. Even ifthe 2Mbps packet transmission
continuously fails, it attempts sending packet at 2Mbps after
each 1Mbps successful attempt.
3. Cost comparison among different types of jammers: Finally,
we compare the efﬁciency of reactive jammer in terms of
Phase-I and Phase-II costs against oblivious jammers. Fig-
ure 8 illustrates the comparison between the performance of
periodic jammer, memoryless jammer, and the reactive jam-
mer for the case of SampleRate. As we can see, reactive
jammer needs only half the energy that the periodic or the
memoryless jammer requires to achieve the same end-goal.
To this end, we have demonstrated that existing rate adaptation
algorithms for IEEE802.11 are highly vulnerable to smart jamming
attacks, which can result in a signiﬁcant degradation of the network
capacity at an extremely low jamming cost for the adversary. 0
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Figure 8: Phase I and Phase II cost comparision for three dif-
ferent kinds of jammers
7. PRELIMINARYMITIGATIONTECHNIQUES
In the following, we sketch several mitigation techniques that
can prevent smart jamming by severely limiting the amount of key
information that can be inferred by an adversary. This lack of in-
formation then forces the adversary to operate as a memoryless
jammer. In the future, we plan to design full ﬂedged mitigation
mechanisms, analyze them, and carry a detailed evaluation of their
performance.
Concealing explicit and implicit rate information: The rate
information can be protected using post-coding encryption. Theen-
cryption should not conﬂict with the decoding process to preserve
the properties of the error correction code. This can be achieved by
generating a cryptographic stream based on a shared secret key and
a random initialization vector. Theinitialization vector is sent in the
clear as the ﬁrst sequence following the frame preamble and before
the PLCP header. The PLCP header and the packet are XORed
with the cryptographic stream. The secret key should either be
pre-shared or established using an appropriate authentication and
key establishment protocol [13,24,31]. This technique will allow
to protect the SIGNAL ﬁeld from being eavesdropped by an adver-
sary and also from guessing the impliciterror correction code being
used.
To further protect against implicit rate guessing using modula-
tion constellation analysis, we propose to use the same high-order
QAM and provide robustness through a larger set of coding rates.
This can be achieved with Trellis Coded Modulation [34].
Finally, IEEE802.11g and IEEE802.11a should not be mixed
with IEEE802.11b as it would be easy to distinguish between the
two physical layers (i.e., OFDM vs. DSSS/CCK).
An adversary might still be able to guess partial information
about the rate from the duration of a transmission. This can be
protected by using constant duration transmissions through packet
length adjustments. However, this is not necessary in practice,
since when monitoring the duration, the adversary only knows if
a higher rate or a lower rate is being used at the end of the trans-
mission. For example, an adversary can only guess if the rate is
54Mbps by examining the duration of the packet when the trans-
mission is over and whence too late to jam the high rate packets.
Unpredictable rate selection rules: While for a protocol such
as ONOE,itmightbe hard tomake itresilientagainst smart-jamming
because of its highly predictable rate selection rules, the popular
SampleRate protocol can easily be protected through randomized
probing. Instead of sending a probe every ten packets, the probing
order should be randomized, furthermore the probed rates should
not be sequential but randomly selected unlike the Madwiﬁ imple-
mentation.
Interferencedifferentiation: Differentiation between malicious
and non-malicious interference, in general, is a difﬁcult problem.
Some mechanisms can be used to detect the presence of a reac-
tive jammer. For example, interrupting the transmission for a short
period of time within the packet (the location is cryptographically
derived) or placing a training sequence at a cryptographic location
within the packet allowing the receiver to detect if a jamming signal
is present.
8. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Inthispaper, weinvestigated the robustness ofIEEE802.11 RAAs
against smart jamming attacks. We consider several classes of
RAAs, and specially analyze three state-of-the-art RAAs: Sam-
pleRate, ONOE, and AMRR. We evaluate these three RAAs and
Windows RAAusing our carefullydesigned GNURadio/USRPaided
testbed. We present optimal jamming strategies that exploit the
weaknesses found in IEEE802.11 MAC and RAAs. Finally, we
discuss the mitigation techniques to alleviate the vulnerabilities that
allows the jammer to execute very smart and efﬁcient jamming at-
tacks. In the future, we plan on implementing those mitigation
techniques and carry a detailed evaluation of their performance.
Our future work also includes studying performance of more cur-
rent RAAs against smart jamming attacks.
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